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Introduction 
The Japanese-American internment litigation1 demonstrated the 
difficulty of holding the government accountable for overreaching in na-
tional security cases. While some have argued that post-9/11 decisions 
break with that trend,2 the Supreme Court has severely limited suits 
 
†  Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I thank Bob 
Chang for comments on a previous draft. 
1. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Eric L. Muller, American 
Inquisition: The Hunt for Japanese American Disloyalty in World 
War II 116–21 (2007) (discussing government stereotypes in wartime 
determinations of Japanese-Americans’ loyalty); Peter Irons, Justice at 
War (1983) (discussing the course of litigation and strategies of key lawyers 
in cases). 
2. See generally Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National 
Security, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1123 (2014). 
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for damages against senior officials.3 In Ziglar v. Abbasi,4 the Supreme 
Court erected virtually impassable barriers to such actions, in a case 
brought by post-9/11 immigration detainees whom senior officials had 
shifted to a high-security facility in the absence of any proof of terrorist 
ties.5 As a result, the detainees had allegedly been subjected to unduly 
long periods of detention and serious physical abuse.6 This Article ar-
gues that the Court’s parsimonious approach to damage suits against 
senior officials will hinder habits of deliberation that the Framers prized 
and impede learning the lessons of the internment. 
The constitutional tort remedies that the Supreme Court hobbled 
in Abbasi stem from a Warren Court precedent, Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,7 in which the Court held 
that the Constitution itself directly implied the existence of a cause of 
action for damages against federal officials.8 Bivens was the contempo-
rary manifestation of two lines of precedent that pre-dated the Consti-
tution’s enactment. English cases well-known to the Framers allowed 
suits for damages against officials by individuals harmed by abusive 
government searches.9 During the Founding Era, individuals obtained 
monetary compensation against officials in prize cases.10 In addition, 
the Framers drafted Article III of the Constitution specifically to 
 
3. See generally Carlos M. Vazquez & Steven I. Vladeck, State Law, the 
Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
509 (2013) (broadly criticizing development of limits on Bivens suits); 
Jonathan Hafetz, Reconceptualizing Federal Courts in the War on Terror, 
56 St. Louis L.J. 1055, 1075–86 (2012) (criticizing curbs on monetary 
remedies in national security cases); Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in 
Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 
96 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (2010) (critiquing judicial limits on Bivens remedies 
in national security cases and suggesting alternative approaches). But see 
Kent, supra note 2, at 1147–54 (arguing that sound doctrinal and pragmatic 
reasons explain evolution of limits on Bivens litigation). 
4. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
5. The Supreme Court first limited detainees’ relief in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 
U.S. 662, 665 (2009) (holding that allegations of discriminatory intent in 
initial investigation of detainees were implausible and that senior officials did 
not have supervisory liability for abuses); see also James E. Pfander, 
Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror 42–44 (2017) 
(critiquing Iqbal’s premises and analysis); Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of 
Iqbal, 105 Geo. L.J. 379 (2017) (discussing the human story behind the 
case). 
6. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1852–53. 
7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
8. Id. at 395–97.  
9. See Pfander, supra note 5, at 6–14. 
10. Id. 
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provide the newly created federal courts with jurisdiction over suits for 
damages and other relief brought by foreign nationals.11 Admittedly, the 
Framers viewed federal jurisdiction over such actions as a corrective 
measure for the biases of state courts.12 Nevertheless, the concerns of 
the Framers—particularly Alexander Hamilton—support a broader 
reading: remedies are apt whenever precipitous action by government 
officials stokes the “spirit of injustice” at the state or federal level. 13 
Writing for the Court in Abbasi, Justice Kennedy failed to ac-
knowledge either precedential strand. Justice Kennedy’s opinion limited 
Bivens claims to three areas carved out in the decade after Bivens: 
searches by federal agents in criminal investigations, prison conditions, 
and employment discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.14 In “new” contexts that moved beyond these confines, Justice 
Kennedy opined that the “factors counselling hesitation” alluded to by 
the Bivens Court precluded access to remedies for constitutional torts.15 
According to Justice Kennedy, suits for damages could unduly chill 
officials’ sense of initiative16 and usurp a function that Kennedy asserted 
belonged to Congress: balancing the deterrence of constitutional viola-
tions against the preservation of officials’ discretion in coping with 
evolving national security threats.17 
To shift to an anti-remedy default stance, Justice Kennedy had to 
ignore the Founding Era pedigree of suits for damages against public 
officials and the constitutional role of suits by foreign nationals. Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion also failed to acknowledge Hamilton’s praise of 
judicial review as a check against the haste, myopia, and prejudice of 
the political branches—praise that also applies to Bivens actions. This 
Article seeks to recover that understanding to counter the deference the 
Court displayed in Abbasi. 
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the history 
of suits for damages against U.S. officials as well as the constitutional 
importance of federal jurisdiction over actions by foreign nationals. This 
history, supported by Hamilton’s vision of judicial review, installed a 
pro-remedy presumption regarding actions for monetary relief against 
 
11. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
12. The Federalist No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961).  
13. Id. (discussing the rationale for judicial review). 
14. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854–55 (2017). 
15. Id. at 1857 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). 
16. Id. at 1868. 
17. Id. at 1862 (cautioning against judicial crafting of remedy such as suit for 
damages absent “affirmative action by Congress”). 
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public officials. Part II outlines the Abbasi Court’s rationale for shifting 
from a pro-remedy presumption to an anti-remedy default that brought 
a “full stop” to Bivens actions development. Part III critiques the 
Abbasi Court’s pivot as unduly discounting history and Hamilton’s 
vision. 
I. History and Founding Era 
Suits for damages against public officials are not a new development 
in American law.18 Their pedigree stretches back to England in the era 
before the Revolutionary War. From that beginning, the history of suits 
for damages or other monetary compensation against officials extends 
to state and federal systems from the Founding Era to the Civil War 
and beyond. That history overlaps within an equally prominent com-
mitment at the time of the Constitution’s enactment to conferring jur-
isdiction on the federal courts to hear suits for damages and other relief 
brought by aggrieved foreign nationals.19 
In England, courts before the Revolution had clearly established 
the right of individuals to sue officials for unreasonable searches and 
seizures.20 In groundbreaking English cases, courts awarded damages for 
abuses committed by officials engaged in searches and seizures, in-
cluding searches authorized by uncabined general warrants that allowed 
officials to search homes for evidence of political opposition to the gov-
ernment. The Framers were aware of these prominent English cases, 
which formed part of the backdrop for enactment of the Fourth Amend-
ment.21 The latter provision’s protection of “the people” against “un-
reasonable searches and seizures”22 borrowed in part from the English 
cases upholding suits for damages against errant or abusive government 
officials. Indeed, a key reason for seeking a specific warrant to search a 
home or other property for evidence of crime was the utility of such a 
warrant as a defense against a subsequent suit for damages brought by 
the owner of the property.23 
 
18. See Pfander, supra note 5, at 6–14. 
19. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien 
Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1609, 1623–24 (2014). 
20. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886); Sina Kian, The Path 
of Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How It Changed, and 
How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 132, 145–46 (2012). 
21. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 
Yale L.J. 393, 402–03 (1995). 
22. U.S. Const. amend IV. 
23. Stuntz, supra note 21, at 410. 
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Payment of monetary compensation was also well-known during 
the U.S. Founding Era. In prize cases, for example, courts regularly 
required that captains who had wrongfully seized vessels provide com-
pensation to the vessel’s rightful owner. This practice occurred in two 
celebrated cases. In Little v. Barreme,24 Chief Justice John Marshall, in 
his opinion for the Court, overcame his initial hesitation in requiring 
that a U.S. navy captain pay compensation to the owner of a ship seized 
in violation of a federal statute.25 In Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy,26 the Court ordered a U.S. navy commander to pay for seizing a 
vessel owned by a foreign national not subject to provisions of U.S. neu-
trality law that limited trade with France.27 
During this time, officials under an obligation to provide such 
compensation regularly received indemnification from Congress.28 
Indemnification, which often occurs today along with funding for legal 
representation, held the official harmless for any adverse award. 
Officials’ knowledge that indemnification would be forthcoming miti-
gated any chilling effect wrought by the prospect of liability on officials’ 
discharge of public duties. Congress typically opted for this regime of 
judicial redress and subsequent indemnification as a superior alternative 
to immunity from suit, which Congress doled out sparingly.29 
Other early cases tell the same tale. For example, in one case a 
court authorized the award of monetary damages against a collector of 
an illegal fine who had entered the defendant’s home and seized prop-
erty to pay a fine.30 State courts regularly considered suits for damages 
against both state and federal officials.31 Through the Civil War, indi-
viduals sued officials alleging torts both constitutional and common-law 
 
24. 6 U.S. 170 (1804). 
25. Id. at 179; cf. Pfander, supra note 5, at 6–9 (discussing Marshall’s opinion). 
26. 6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
27. Id. at 125. 
28. Pfander, supra note 5, at 9–11. 
29. Id. at 11; Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 531–42. 
30. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806). 
31. Vasquez & Vladeck, supra note 3, at 570–71. 
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in nature.32 Congress enacted legislation intended to provide officials 
with protection from liability.33 
In sum, in English courts and U.S. courts from the Founding Era 
through the aftermath of the Civil War, the courts’ default position fa-
vored the availability of suits for damages against public officials. 
Specific legislation from Congress could either immunize or indemnify 
those officials. However, absent such express congressional action, 
courts would routinely entertain lawsuits against official defendants.34 
 
32. These suits usually sought redress for detention associated with that conflict. 
Plaintiffs typically alleged that the detentions were unlawful and a violation 
of the Suspension Clause, which courts have read to guarantee access to 
habeas corpus to persons within the United States not charged with a crime, 
who are also not belligerents in the armed conflict prompting the detention. 
See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 
Colum. L. Rev. 1533, 1560–62 (2007); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an 
Emergency Power, 118 Yale L.J. 600, 651–55 (2009); see also Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31–33 (1942) (discussing Civil War precedent); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing detention of presumptive U.S. 
citizen and alleged Al Qaeda fighter after 9/11). 
33. Starting over eighty years after the end of the Civil War, Congress also 
played a role in providing compensation to the victims of the Japanese-
American internment. The Supreme Court never formally adjudicated the 
constitutional merits of the detention of Japanese-Americans pursuant to the 
internment program. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
Rather, the Court merely upheld the conviction of Fred Korematsu for 
declining to obey the military evacuation order that applied to Japanese-
Americans on the West Coast. Id. at 224. Congress had made failure to 
comply with such orders a federal offense. Almost forty years after the 
Court’s Korematsu decision, a federal district court granted Korematsu’s 
writ of coram nobis seeking to vacate his conviction on grounds that the 
government’s evacuation order and legal defense of the order were riddled 
with misrepresentations and material omissions. See Korematsu v. United 
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419–20 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 828 F.2d 591, 597–604 (9th Cir. 1987) (summarizing the 
district court’s findings); Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 232–36, 246–
53 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (detailing facts of government deception at time of 
internment while holding that concealment of government 
misrepresentations warranted tolling of statute of limitations for claims for 
damages); vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Around this 
time, Congress, which had enacted a measure shortly after World War II, 
provided modest compensation to internees as well as an acknowledgment of 
official wrongdoing. See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice 
on Trial—Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the 
War on Terror, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1321 (2003). 
34. It is true that over time courts adjudicating suits for damages against officials 
began to distinguish between conduct based on delegated discretion and 
unauthorized acts. See Kian, supra note 20, at 154. However, this distinction 
never fully addressed the departure it entailed from prior doctrine and 
practice. Id. 
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Justice Kennedy’s concern in Abbasi with the novel nature of 
certain suits for damages by foreign nationals should not obscure the 
fact that Framers viewed openness to those lawsuits as a key rationale 
for the Constitution’s enactment. While the Articles of Confederation 
were in force, private violence was common against foreign nationals, 
particularly British subjects.35 United States citizens who were 
indignant about British ownership of property in the post-Revolution 
republic often resorted to self-help, taking property when it suited them. 
Under the international law of the period, the failure to redress such 
wrongs constituted just cause for war waged by the country whose 
citizens were deprived of remedies. In drafting the Constitution, the 
Framers authorized Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against 
the Law of Nations.”36 Pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause, 
Congress passed legislation, including the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 
which gave a remedy to foreign nationals injured by torts committed in 
violation of international law.37 In addition, in Article III of the 
Constitution, the Framers expressly conferred on the federal courts 
jurisdiction to hear claims involving “foreign . . . Citizens.”38 This 
sustained attention was no accident. 
In Federalist No. 80, Hamilton squarely linked the need for federal 
courts with their role in upholding fairness for foreign nationals in the 
United States.39 Hamilton acknowledged that the United States’ “denial 
or perversion of justice” in a matter concerning a foreign national would 
rank highly among the “just causes of war.”40 To avoid this risk to the 
new republic, Hamilton championed Article III’s provision of a neutral, 
independent tribunal for adjudication of such disputes.41 Notably, 
Hamilton viewed the role of the federal courts as “essential to the 
 
35. See Bellia & Clark, supra note 19, at 1623–24. 
36. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 10. 
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
38. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
39. See The Federalist No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961).  
40. See id. Views articulated in the Federalist Papers are instructive, although 
caution is appropriate in extrapolating from essays by Hamilton, Madison, 
and Jay to the intentions of the Framers as a group. See David McGowan, 
Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the 
Supreme Court, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 755, 755–59 (2001). 
41. Federalist No. 78 famously articulates Hamilton’s vision of an independent 
federal judiciary protected by life tenure under Article III. See The 
Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 465 (describing an independent 
judiciary as an “excellent barrier” to the risk of oppression by the political 
branches). 
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preservation of the public faith”42 in the rule of law, not merely as an 
expedient to avoid foreign entanglements. As we shall see, Hamilton’s 
view here suggests that federal courts adjudicating matters involving 
foreign nationals would have the same salutary effect that such neutral 
tribunals would have elsewhere on instilling sound habits of deliberation 
in public officials.43 
Legal defenses in tort asserted by foreign nationals also played a 
vital role in the development of U.S. constitutionalism, including the 
institution of judicial review. A vital case under the Articles of Confed-
eration, Rutgers v. Waddington,44 pitted the brilliant young Alexander 
Hamilton against the plain reading of a New York statute allowing U.S. 
citizens to sue British citizens who had obtained title to U.S. nationals’ 
land during the Revolution. Often this change of title occurred as 
British troops assumed control over land during the Revolution’s mili-
tary campaigns. British forces then conveyed the land to British sub-
jects to ensure the loyalty of property owners. The treaty with Britain 
ending the conflict provided protection for British nationals who had 
taken title based on military orders. 
Hamilton argued that both the treaty and customary international 
law provided the British owners with a defense against trespass actions 
lodged by the former U.S. owners who had fled during the fighting.45 
According to Hamilton, the New York court hearing the trespass action 
had to construe the state statute in light of international law, providing 
the British nationals with a defense despite the clear wording of the 
New York statute.46 
 
42. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 39, at 476. 
43. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 470–71 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (arguing that prudent public officials who wished to avoid rebuffs 
in the courts would “qualify their attempts” at overreaching; the 
“moderation” yielded by this tempering “influence upon the character of our 
governments” would enhance long-term thinking and thus aid 
constitutionalism). 
44. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor’s Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 The Law 
Practice of Alexander Hamilton: Documents and Commentary 
393–419 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964); see also Daniel M. Golove & Daniel 
J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the 
Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 932, 963–66 (2010) (analyzing Rutgers); Peter Margulies, Defining, 
Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material Support 
and Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 Fordham Int’l L.J. 
1, 17–19 (2013) (same). 
45. Margulies, supra note 44, at 18.  
46. See id.  
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Scholars have rightly recognized Rutgers as a landmark in the 
development of U.S. theories of judicial review.47 Hamilton nodded to 
its reasoning in Federalist No. 78, in which he argued that judicial dis-
cretion included the venerable craft of endeavoring that two provisions 
in tension be “by any fair construction . . . reconciled to each other.”48 
Where this was impossible, Hamilton explained, a court would have to 
prioritize one provision over the other.49 In Rutgers, Hamilton per-
suaded the New York court to stretch construction of the New York 
statute in order to avoid a clash with international law.50 This move set 
the stage for Chief Justice Marshall’s articulation in Marbury v. 
Madison of the rationale for judicial review.51 It also was a template for 
Marshall’s formulation in the Charming Betsy case of the canon that 
the courts should construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with inter-
national law.52 This vital conceptual work all flowed from Rutgers, a 
suit involving a tort defense asserted by a foreign national. In sum, 
suits and defenses by foreign nationals played a prominent role in build-
ing U.S. constitutionalism.53 
 
47. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 44, at 963. 
48. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 468. 
49. Id. 
50. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of 
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 
479, 487 n.41 (1998). 
51. See id. 
52. Id. at 487. 
53. The passage of the Alien Act during the presidency of John Adams does not 
undercut this early record of due regard for the rights and interests of foreign 
nationals. The Alien Act gave the President authority to deport any foreign 
national whom the President deemed to be “dangerous to the peace and 
safety of the United States.” Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The 
Age of Federalism 591 (1993). However, President John Adams did not 
invoke the Alien Act, which expired in June of 1800. Id. at 591–92. Moreover, 
political figures closely involved in the Constitution’s enactment, including 
both Madison and Hamilton, were wary of the Act. Hamilton, himself an 
immigrant from the West Indies, found the statute “deficient in precautions 
against abuse.” From Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, 2 February 
1799, Nat’l Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Hamilton/01-22-02-0267 [https://perma.cc/AQT8-KUBC] (last visited Feb. 
22, 2018); see H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: A Essay in 
Historical Retrieval, 80 Va. L. Rev. 689, 704 n.52 (1994). Madison, for his 
part, viewed both statutes as a signal of the Federalists’ arrogance and 
predilection for abuse of power. See, e.g., Elkins & McKitrick, supra, at 
700–05. Those excesses helped usher in the victory of the Jeffersonian 
Democratic Republicans in 1800, who campaigned in large part against the 
effects of the Alien and Sedition Acts. See, e.g., id. at 696–701. If anything, 
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The Supreme Court’s decision over 150 years later in Bivens did 
not directly acknowledge the extended pedigree of suits for damages 
against public officials. However, the decision continued the pro-remedy 
default position that characterized this area during the Founding Era 
and in subsequent years. In Bivens, the plaintiff sought damages for a 
warrantless search for drugs at his home in which federal agents 
allegedly used flagrantly excessive force on him in full view of his 
family.54 According to Bivens, the search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.55 The search 
yielded no evidence of drugs, and authorities never charged Bivens with 
a crime.56 
Both Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, and Justice Harlan, 
who authored an influential concurrence, cited the equitable discretion 
that federal courts presumptively possess.57 Each Justice noted that 
equitable discretion traditionally includes weighing the efficacy of pro-
posed remedies. In Bivens’ case, those remedies were limited. An injunc-
tion would not be appropriate in the absence of evidence that federal 
agents planned further warrantless searches of Bivens’ residence. 
Moreover, the exclusionary rule was not applicable, since the govern-
ment had not charged Bivens with a crime, let alone sought to admit 
illegally seized evidence in such a prosecution. Given the absence of 
other remedies for the alleged official misconduct against Bivens, 
Justices Brennan and Harlan in their respective opinions agreed that 
equitable discretion pointed to damages against the offending officials 
as the most appropriate remedy.58 
Although the Bivens Court’s invocation of equitable discretion was 
a persuasive rationale, the omission by Justices Brennan and Harlan of 
damage suits’ long pedigree made the reasoning of these opinions appear 
evanescent. Each opinion addressed Congress’s role in ways that au-
gured ill for expansion of Bivens. Justice Harlan’s concurrence cited 
contemporary cases in which the Court had found that inferring the 
availability of a private right of action for violation of a statute 
 
the Alien Act’s toothless implementation and speedy demise demonstrate 
the regard for foreign nationals during the Founding Era. 
54. See Pfander, supra note 5, at 20. 
55. Id. at 23. 
56. Id. at 20. 
57. Justice Brennan stated that “where legal rights have been invaded [and there 
is a right to sue] . . . federal courts may use any available remedy to make 
good the wrong done.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S 388, 396 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678, 684 (1946) (internal quotations omitted)). Justice Harlan echoed this 
proposition in his concurrence. Id. at 400–02 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
58. Id. at 395–97 (majority opinion); id. at 406–10 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
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effectuated legislative intent.59 That reference, as we shall see, weakened 
the case for Bivens remedies when the Court turned against implied 
rights of action, finding them an intrusion into Congress’s prerogatives. 
In addition, Justice Brennan added an important caveat, observing that 
permitting a suit for damages against public officials would not be ap-
propriate in the presence of what Justice Brennan cryptically called 
“special factors counselling hesitation” in creating such a remedy.60 
Those “special factors,” Justice Brennan explained, should trigger judi-
cial restraint in creating remedies absent some “affirmative” indication 
from Congress that it believed such a remedy was necessary.61 Over 
time, as we shall see, Supreme Court decisions culminating in Abbasi 
cited these concerns as a basis for reversing the pro-remedy default posi-
tion that had prevailed since the Framers’ day. 
In the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected 
efforts to make Bivens actions available in different contexts. For exam-
ple, in Wilkie v. Robbins,62 the Court declined to find that Bivens ex-
tended to a property owner’s claim that federal officials had retaliated 
against him because of a long-simmering land dispute.63 Similarly, in 
Hartman v. Moore,64 the Court held that no claim for damages was 
available to a person who alleged that federal officials retaliated against 
him by initiating an unfounded criminal prosecution.65 
In addition, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,66 which involved the post-9/11 
immigration detentions also at issue in Abbasi, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs had not plausibly pleaded their allegations that senior officials 
intentionally targeted the plaintiffs for arrest because of their race, 
religion, or national origin.67 As Justice Kennedy put it in his opinion 
for the Court in Iqbal, this line of precedent has shown that the Court 
is “reluctant to extend Bivens liability ‘to any new context or new 
category of defendants.’”68 In other words, the Court has balked at rec-
ognizing an action for damages directly under the Constitution against 
federal officials in any setting apart from those narrow contexts rec-
ognized by Bivens itself and its two immediate progeny: searches by 
federal agents, prison conditions, and employment discrimination in 
 
59. Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
60. Id. at 396 (majority opinion). 
61. Id. 
62. 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
63. Id. at 541–43. 
64. 547 U.S. 250 (2006). 
65. Id. at 262–66.  
66. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
67. Id. at 669, 686–87.  
68. Id. at 675 (citation omitted). 
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violation of the Equal Protection Clause. That reticence set the stage 
for the Court’s decisive retreat from Bivens in Abbasi. 
II. Abbasi and the Story of the Post-9/11 Immigration 
Roundup 
Abbasi was not the first Supreme Court case to address the arrest 
and detention of immigrants after 9/11; as noted above, Iqbal came be-
fore. Indeed, the skepticism about Bivens in national security cases that 
Justice Kennedy revealed in Iqbal was a harbinger of the glum reception 
that the Bivens claims received from the Court in the latter case. 
However, the facts of Abbasi also present a counter-narrative, which 
could have impelled a different Court to recognize the Bivens action’s 
value in national security litigation.69 Understanding that counter-nar-
rative is essential to grasping the cost to constitutionalism of the road 
not taken in Abbasi. 
A. Immigration, Detention, and National Security 
One obstacle to the counter-narrative in Abbasi was a fact not lost 
on the Court: the deference the Court has often displayed to the poli-
tical branches on immigration matters. Well over a century ago, the 
Court held that Congress has plenary power over immigration.70 That 
power is at its height on issues concerning criteria for the admission of 
foreign nationals to the United States. National security justifications 
have contributed to this deferential posture. 
In the past, the Supreme Court has upheld the indefinite detention 
of foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States.71 In one case 
during the Cold War, the detainee was a lawful permanent resident, 
but not a citizen, who departed from the United States; officials cited 
national security reasons for barring his subsequent reentry. In that 
case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,72 the government re-
lied on secret evidence that it refused to disclose to the courts.73 The 
 
69. Shirin Sinnar has provided the most compelling account of that counter-
narrative, framed by an insightful analysis of the Iqbal decision. See generally 
Sinnar, supra note 5. 
70. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600–03, 609 (1889). 
71. This paragraph and the following two borrow from earlier work. See 
Geoffrey Corn, Jimmy Gurulé, Eric Talbot Jensen & Peter 
Margulies, National Security Law: Principles and Policy 296 
(2015). 
72. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
73. Id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the detention, viewing the executive 
branch as exercising power duly delegated to it by Congress.74 
While the government claimed that its post-9/11 immigration 
detentions focused on possible terrorist links, the Justice Department’s 
own Inspector General subsequently found that government personnel 
participating in this effort detected virtually no evidence of terrorist 
ties among the detainees.75 Instead, the investigation from the start cen-
tered on routine immigration violations committed by Muslim immi-
grants from the Middle East and South Asia. The FBI received 96,000 
tips about individuals who in some fashion prompted suspicion.76 Many 
tips stemmed from gossipy neighbors, landlords looking for the latest 
rent check, and old employers with a grudge.77 
Many other tips in the FBI’s sprawling post-9/11 investigation 
flowed from more generic fears, as a jumpy populace chafed about the 
mere presence of Middle Eastern or South Asian persons. For example, 
one tipster warned investigators that a grocery store was “operated by 
numerous Middle Eastern men.”78 Government investigators raided the 
store, checked employees’ immigration status, and arrested those with-
out valid immigration documents.79 In another case, facts underlying an 
initial arrest suggested a possible terrorist link, but subsequent evidence 
disproved that theory.80 In that case, New York City police officers cited 
the Middle Eastern driver of a car for a traffic violation. In searching 
the vehicle, which also contained two passengers from the Middle East, 
the police found plans for a public school. Police contacted the men’s 
employer, who informed the authorities that the men needed the plans 
because they were doing construction work on school grounds.81 Despite 
 
74. Id. at 214–16.  
75. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The September 11 
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration 
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 
41–42 (2003) [hereinafter September 11 Detainees], https://oig.justice.gov/ 
special/0306/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3JW-5DPK] (concluding that 
arrests generally occurred because of “chance encounters or tenuous 
connections” rather than “genuine indications” of terrorist ties). 
76. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 225–27 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d sub nom. 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
77. Peter Margulies, Law’s Detour: Politics, Ideology, and Justice 
in the Bush Administration 28 (2010). 
78. Id. at 28–29. 
79. Id. 
80. Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 231. 
81. Id. 
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this clear evidence that was counter to the terrorism theory, federal of-
ficials arrested and detained the individuals in question.82 
Far from being foreign agents, a large majority of the detainees 
were ordinary undocumented immigrants who had lived in the New 
York metropolitan area for years. Like most undocumented immigrants, 
the detainees had participated in the underground economy and scram-
bled to find unskilled work.83 Prior to 9/11, the detainees had melded 
into the metropolitan landscape, living from paycheck to paycheck like 
many U.S. citizens and lawful residents. In some cases, like some U.S. 
citizens and lawful residents struggling to make ends meet, the detain-
ees had engaged in low-level criminal conduct such as identity theft, al-
beit conduct with no link to terrorism.84 
In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, the government used such 
sweeps to arrest and detain in federal correctional facilities more than 
700 undocumented immigrants from a range of countries in the Middle 
East and South Asia.85 Many of the detainees could not contact lawyers. 
Moreover, federal correction officers and other nonimmigrant inmates 
subjected a substantial number of the detainees to egregious physical 
abuse.86 When detainees sought release from detention as they awaited 
their removal from the United States, government lawyers told im-
migration judges in the Justice Department’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review that the detentions were part of an investigation 
into the 9/11 attacks. However, the government never presented spe-
cific, concrete evidence of terrorist links, apparently because such links 
did not exist.87 
Plaintiffs—in allegations that courts found to be plausible—
asserted that senior officials knowingly or intentionally made decisions 
that led to the ill treatment and excessive detention experienced by 
some of the detainees.88 The plaintiffs’ pleadings did not allege that sen-
ior officials ordered the ill treatment.89 However, senior officials al-
legedly merged a “New York List” of detainees with a broader na-
tionwide list compiled by what was then the Justice Department’s 
 
82. Id. 
83. See Sinnar, supra note 5, at 394–95.  
84. Id. at 395–96. 
85. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1852 (2017). 
86. Id. at 1853. 
87. Id.  
88. Id. at 1853–54. 
89. Id. at 1854. 
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).90 The INS List in-
cluded persons whom the FBI had, typically without any evidence, 
designated as “of interest” to the 9/11 investigation.91 Senior officials 
had earlier decided to “exert maximum pressure” on this group by re-
stricting their contacts, delaying final immigration hearings, and in-
forming law enforcement authorities that the detainees were suspected 
terrorists, even though no evidence revealed terrorist ties.92 The effect 
of that merger was the subjection of many New York detainees to harsh 
conditions such as segregation in maximum-security federal correctional 
units and subjection to physical abuse, even when “no . . . suspicion 
existed” that the detainees had links to terrorism.93 Moreover, abundant 
publicity should have made reasonable officials aware of these horren-
dous conditions early on in the detention process.94 
B. Retrenching on Remedies: The Court’s Decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi 
In Abbasi, the Court held that a Bivens action was not available to 
the post-9/11 plaintiffs. The majority’s rationale95 definitively reversed 
the pro-remedy presumption that had governed actions for damages 
against public officials since before the Founding Era. To accomplish 
this, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, invoked the proviso in 
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Bivens. According to Justice Kennedy, 
“special factors counselling hesitation” precluded a Bivens action in 
Abbasi and would likely have the same effect in most “new” contexts 
beyond the hoary troika of domestic searches, prison conditions, and 
employment discrimination that the Court had set out decades earlier.96 
In new contexts, Justice Kennedy contended, a Bivens action was likely 
to chill officials’ legitimate discretion and interfere with Congress’s 
 
90. See generally Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F. 3d 218, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2015). 
Subsequently, Congress reorganized immigration agencies, and INS became 
the division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) within the 
new federal Department of Homeland Security. 
91. Id. at 231. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 232. 
94. Margulies, supra note 3, at 222. Because this publicity was so extensive, a 
reasonable factfinder could readily have inferred that senior officials knew of 
these abuses. 
95. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas. Justice Breyer filed a dissent, which 
Justice Ginsburg joined. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch took no 
part in the case. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
96. See id. at 1857–58. 
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ability to balance deterrence, compensation, and the risk of hampering 
officials’ discharge of their duties.97 
To justify reversing the pro-remedy presumption that Bivens con-
tinued, Justice Kennedy cited the Court’s post-Bivens pivot from find-
ing of implied rights of action under statutes.98 Justice Kennedy asserted 
that the separation of powers concerns that had driven the Court’s 
reticence in inferring private rights of action under statutes should 
prompt similar caution regarding causes of action for constitutional 
rights.99 According to Justice Kennedy, just as finding an implied 
statutory right of action might skew a carefully calibrated statutory 
scheme, finding a right of action directly under the Constitution might 
upset a framework that met Congress’s needs.100 Courts should therefore 
be cautious, absent the “affirmative” indication from Congress that the 
Bivens majority had stated would be necessary when “special factors 
counselling hesitation” suggested the importance of judicial restraint.101 
On this view, courts intrude on Congress’s prerogatives if they 
recognize a right of action that can affect relationships between state 
and federal governments or among private sector entities. The unin-
tended consequences wrought by litigation are a fit subject for Congress 
to weigh in the balance against the importance of deterring wrongdoing 
and compensating victims. Requiring Congress to expressly recognize a 
private right of action for damages ensures that Congress will engage 
in this balancing task, for which it is more suited than the courts. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted in Abbasi, the potential for litigation 
can distract senior officials from their duties. In addition, the adverse 
consequences of suits for damages may be unnecessary to prevent abuse, 
since other remedies such as habeas corpus are available to victims.102 
Elaborating on this theme, Justice Kennedy outlined a number of 
factors that should guide courts in deciding when to recognize Bivens 
actions. First, Justice Kennedy cited the newness test, noting that 
courts should decline to imply a right of action under the Constitution 
when the case is “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens 
 
97. See id. at 1860–63. 
98. Id. at 1855. 
99. Id. at 1856. 
100. Id. at 1858. 
101. See id.; see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1402–03 (2018) 
(invoking reluctance to infer that Congress authorized suits for damages in 
holding that foreign corporations were not cognizable defendants under Alien 
Tort Statute); Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort 
Statute, and Transnational Public-Law Adjudication After Kiobel, 64 Duke 
L.J. 1023, 1069–72 (2015) (discussing parallels between the Court’s evolving 
view of implied statutory and constitutional rights of action). 
102. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–1863. 
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cases decided by this Court.”103 Expanding on this amorphous caveat, 
Justice Kennedy noted certain differences that would be “meaningful 
enough” to frame the action as “new” under the Court’s definition.104 
For example, a court could consider the: 
[R]ank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; 
the generality or specificity of the official action, the extent of 
judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the 
problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other 
legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of 
disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other 
branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous 
Bivens cases did not consider.105 
With these criteria as a general guide, Justice Kennedy dug deeper 
in the details of the post-9/11 detention. Justice Kennedy’s rationale 
relied heavily on the same tacit view of government probity that he had 
exhibited earlier in Iqbal—the Court’s earlier decision holding that the 
post-9/11 immigration detainees’ complaints of discrimination were not 
plausible.106 In Iqbal, Justice Kennedy described the decisions author-
izing the arrest and detention of immigrants after 9/11 as a “legitimate 
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals be-
cause of their suspected link to the attacks.”107 As we have seen, Justice 
Kennedy’s anodyne description contrasted sharply with the random 
 
103. Id. at 1859. In January, 2018, the Court also refined its test for determining 
when government officials enjoyed qualified immunity from suit. See District 
of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018) (clarifying that, even 
when a cause of action is available to sue officials for damages, officials lose 
qualified immunity only when legal rule barring their conduct is not merely 
“suggested by then-existing precedent” but is “clear enough that every 
reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the 
plaintiff seeks to apply”) (emphasis added); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 
S. Ct. 1148, 1152–54 (2018) (per curiam) (in determining whether law is 
“clearly established” for purpose of abrogating official’s qualified immunity 
from suit, reading “clearly established” test narrowly to preserve qualified 
immunity when police officer shot individual carrying a knife who officer 
believed posed a threat to another). While the subject of qualified immunity 
is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court’s high threshold for “settled 
law” that vitiates qualified immunity parallels the analysis in Abbasi of the 
precedent required to establish the availability of a Bivens remedy in a 
particular factual context. 
104. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60. 
105. Id. at 1860. 
106. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681–83 (2009) (holding that allegations of 
discriminatory intent in initial investigation of detainees were implausible 
and that senior officials did not have supervisory liability for abuses). 
107. Id. at 682. 
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roundup that the Justice Department’s own Inspector General de-
scribed.108 
Justice Kennedy’s evaluation in Abbasi of the risks and benefits 
posed by the availability of Bivens was a study in asymmetry. In 
marked distinction to the premises that usually prevail under judicial 
review of detention, Justice Kennedy viewed the risk of unlawful official 
conduct as remote.109 In contrast, Justice Kennedy viewed the risk of 
hindering “legitimate” national security efforts as immediate.110 
According to Justice Kennedy, the decision to detain certain noncitizens 
for substantial periods under harsh conditions despite the absence of 
evidence linking detainees to terrorism was not heedless or vindictive; 
rather, it was a “high-level executive policy created in the wake of a 
major terrorist attack on American soil.”111 Justice Kennedy asserted 
that officials need to “discharge . . . their duties”112 in the face of such 
crises. Those duties include deliberation about possible responses to the 
threat of future attacks. 
According to Justice Kennedy, pursuit of a damages claim against 
the senior officials responsible for the policy could impede official de-
cisions that must of necessity compress deliberation into a tight tempo-
ral window.113 As Justice Kennedy observed, litigation would entail 
“inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the discussions and 
deliberations” that drove those official actions.114 Justice Kennedy as-
serted that such judicial proceedings would “interfere in an intrusive 
way with sensitive functions of the Executive Branch.”115 The prospect 
of litigation could cause officials to “second-guess difficult but necessary 
decisions,”116 stifling capabilities that the executive branch needs to 
respond to an evolving spectrum of threats.117 
 
108. Cf. Sinnar, supra note 5, at 428–30 (noting the tenor and substance in the 
Iqbal majority opinion and cautioning about its insidious long-term effects). 
109. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1863. 
110. Id. at 1861. 
111. Id. at 1860. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1860–61. 
115. Id. at 1861. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1862 (cautioning against judicial crafting of remedy such as suit for 
damages absent “affirmative action by Congress”) (citing Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 
(1971)). Shortly after deciding Abbasi, the Supreme Court remanded a case 
involving a border shooting with instructions to the court below to consider 
the case in light of Abbasi’s approach. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy portrayed the trade-off between com-
pensating victims and hindering future national security efforts as a 
zero-sum game. For Justice Kennedy, even the prospect of a detainee 
lawsuit for damages litigated to a disposition on the merits would ad-
versely affect future officials’ vigilance against national security threats. 
Justice Kennedy never acknowledged that a space might exist in which 
future officials would steer clear of egregious abuses while still remain-
ing devoted to the protection of the U.S. public. Justice Kennedy’s vi-
sion of a stark choice between overreaction and utter abdication would 
have puzzled the Framers, who favored moderation in official decisions. 
III. Critiquing Abbasi’s Anti-Remedy Presumption 
On several fronts, the reasoning in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in Abbasi should elicit countervailing arguments. The opin-
ion’s equation of statutory and constitutional causes of action is flawed. 
In addition, the opinion’s view of damages as an extraordinary remedy 
and injunctions or habeas corpus as the norm conflicts with traditional 
assumptions. More broadly, the opinion’s reliance on the perceived nov-
elty of a lawsuit as the boundary between accepted and disfavored uses 
of Bivens liability introduces a subjective and arbitrary element into 
judicial review. Similarly, the opinion’s zero-sum account of the trade-
off between deterrence of constitutional violations and vigilance against 
terrorist threats unduly shrinks the space available to honor both 
virtues. 
 
2003, 2006–07 (2017) (per curiam). In Hernandez, an agent of the U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”), which along with ICE is now part of 
the Department of Homeland Security, stood on U.S. territory and from that 
position shot and killed an unarmed Mexican teenage boy on Mexican 
territory. The culvert where the CBP agent, the boy, and the boy’s friends 
were located was an area straddling the U.S.-Mexican border that by custom, 
practice, and formal agreement, had been maintained by the United States 
for years. Id. at 2009–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The boy’s family sued the 
CBP agent for damages, claiming that the shooting violated the boy’s rights 
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Fifth Circuit had resolved 
the case by holding that the boy, as a Mexican national on Mexican territory, 
had no Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 2007. The Supreme Court declined 
to resolve this issue, citing its sensitivity and “far reaching” consequences. 
Instead, the Court directed the Fifth Circuit to first consider whether Abbasi 
barred assertion of a claim for damages, whatever the merits of the 
underlying substantive issue. Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the 
Court should have held that the Fourth Amendment applied, given the close 
cooperation between the United States and Mexico on maintenance of the 
culvert in which the shooting occurred. Id. at 2009–10. Justice Breyer would 
have remanded solely on the Abbasi question. Id. at 2011. On remand, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the lawsuit presented a “new context” and therefore 
was an inappropriate vessel for a Bivens claim. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 
F.3d 811, 816–18 (5th Cir. 2018).   
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A. The Difference Between Constitutional and Statutory Claims 
Justice Kennedy’s analogy between constitutional and statutory 
causes of action is flawed. First, constitutional causes of action have a 
much sturdier pedigree, dating back to English courts’ invocation of 
unwritten “ancient rights” prior to the American Revolution and the 
enactment of the U.S. Constitution. Those actions informed the U.S. 
colonists’ fight for independence and the Framers’ understanding of fun-
damental legal rights. In the Founding Era and after, courts upheld 
damage suits against officials for comparable reasons.118 
Rights guaranteed by the Constitution require a fuller suite of 
protections than those afforded statutory duties. The latter Congress 
can confer or take away, as it chooses. However, the former are part of 
the fundamental charter of governance itself. As Hamilton noted in his 
denunciation of pre-Constitution efforts to confiscate the property of 
colonists who had remained loyal to Britain during the Revolutionary 
War, “the constitution is the compact made between the society at 
large and the individual. The society therefore cannot, without breach 
of faith and injustice, refuse to any individual, a single advantage which 
he derives under that compact.”119 To do so is a recipe for “arbitrary” 
government, not the rule of law.120 Without a robust capacity to deter 
this overreaching, officials can quickly assume the role of “perpetual 
 
118. Justice Story was particularly clear on this point. See The Apollon, 22 U.S. 
362, 366–67 (1824). Justice Story explained that:  
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the 
high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, 
to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, 
by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws. 
Such measures are properly matters of state, and if the [executive] 
responsibility is taken, under justifiable circumstances, the 
Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this Court 
can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated; 
and if they were, justice demands that the injured party should 
receive a suitable redress.  
 Id; see also Pfander, supra note 5, at 165 (discussing ramifications of 
Story’s view for post-9/11 abuses). 
119. Second Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York, 
reprinted in Works of Alexander Hamilton; Comprising His 
Correspondence, and His Political and Official Writings, 
Exclusive of the Federalist, Civil and Military 301, 322 (C. John 
ed., 1851) [hereinafter Second Letter from Phocion]; see also Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the 
Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 
825, 841 (2006) (discussing Hamilton’s vigorous advocacy against measures 
targeting loyalists). 
120. See Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 322. 
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dictators.”121 The failure of deterrence thus strains the separation of 
powers and other structural provisions that enable the legislature to 
function. The stakes for constitutional governance require a cause of ac-
tion to fully remedy constitutional torts. 
Hamilton’s warning about the risks of post-Revolution confiscatory 
policies toward loyalists dovetails with the stain of the Japanese-Ameri-
can internment and the needlessly harsh post-9/11 roundup of Muslims. 
Hamilton criticized the “passion . . . prejudice . . . [and] resentment” 
that drove state measures in New York and elsewhere to strip loyalists 
of their property.122 Those negative emotions at the state level drove 
federal actions against Japanese-Americans in the aftermath of Pearl 
Harbor.123 
In certain respects, the impetus and nature of the post-9/11 round-
up was different. Virtually all of the detainees lacked a lawful immi-
gration status, which meant that officials could lawfully arrest and re-
move them, with detention authorized when necessary to prevent acts 
of violence and ensure their appearance for subsequent proceedings.124 
Moreover, public pronouncements by senior officials after the 9/11 at-
tacks lacked the pervasive bigotry that characterized discourse about 
the need for internment during World War II. On the other hand, senior 
officials’ willingness to order harsh detention of a particular group of 
immigrants with distinctive markers for religion, ethnicity, and national 
origin echoed the abuses of earlier eras. The determination to “exert 
maximum pressure”125 on this particular group absent any evidence of 
terrorist ties suggests that senior officials viewed the need for fairness 
and individualized criteria as what Hamilton sardonically called “partial 
inconveniences.”126 When rule-of-law principles become inconvenient, 
Hamilton warned, “the constitution is slighted or explained away.”127 
Maintaining constitutionalism is hard work; officials cannot slacken 
their efforts to promote constitutionalist values because the rule of law 
seems to be a nuisance. Diverging from the deference to official discre-
tion exhibited in Abbasi, Hamilton appeared to suggest that preserving 
constitutionalism required robust remedies. 
 
121. Id. 
122. See id. at 328. 
123. See generally Irons, supra note 1, at 7; Yamamoto et al., supra note 33, 
at 1274–75 (citation omitted). 
124. Margulies, supra note 77, at 27–28. 
125. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F. 3d 218, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2015). 
126. Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 322. 
127. Id. at 328. 
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B. Misplacing Damages in the Hierarchy of Remedies 
Citing available alternatives to a suit for damages also misconceives 
the rationale for such suits and their venerable place in the hierarchy 
of relief for official wrongs. At common law, suits for damages were the 
default, and injunctions were an “extraordinary remedy.”128 Under long-
standing principles guiding equitable discretion, a court would not issue 
an injunction unless a suit for damages was an inadequate remedy. By 
making issuance of an injunction contingent on there being no “ade-
quate remedy at law,”129 courts limited the availability of injunctive 
relief. Determination of whether an award of damages was an “ade-
quate” remedy would hinge on whether a party would suffer “irrep-
arable harm” from ongoing violations of law while litigating the award 
of damages.130 One reason for this doctrinal distinction is the potential 
for overreaching in injunctions, which mandate certain conduct as a 
means of compliance with the injunction’s terms.131 In contrast, a suit 
for damages leaves the defendant a choice—engage in wrongful conduct 
and pay damages to wronged persons, or refrain from that conduct. 
That choice, according to the common law, is less intrusive than in-
junctive mandates.132 On this view, an award of damages is more in 
keeping with individual liberty in private law disputes and more con-
sistent with appropriate deference for government in public law. Given 
this traditional view of injunctions as a more intrusive remedy than 
damages, it is ironic that Justice Kennedy in Abbasi highlighted the po-
tential for disruption wrought by suits for damages. That perspective 
turns traditional equitable doctrine on its head.133 
 
128. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); see also 
Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 
997, 1028–29 (2015) (analyzing case law). 
129. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Bray, supra 
note 128, at 1004. But see Douglas Laycock, The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule 3–36 (1991) (arguing that finding of irreparable 
injury is often irrelevant in practice when courts determine whether or not 
to grant a permanent injunction). 
130. Bray, supra note 128, at 1005. 
131. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 33 (2008) (holding that the 
court failed to exercise appropriate discretion when it enjoined naval training 
exercise because U.S. Navy had failed to complete environmental impact 
statement). But see Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of 
Statutes, 96 Va. L. Rev. 485, 486 (2010) (critiquing Winter as exhibiting 
undue deference to government). 
132. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 30–31 (noting that a “more intrusive restriction” in 
the form of an injunction on a naval training exercise may threaten the 
navy’s preparedness for war). 
133. Justice Kennedy made this inversion of traditional approaches express by 
noting that concerns about judicial intrusion on executive decision-making 
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy was unduly optimistic in surmising that 
the post-9/11 immigration detainees could have availed themselves of 
any alternative remedies. Justice Kennedy suggested that the detainees 
might have been able to seek “injunctive relief” or challenge conditions 
of confinement by filing petitions for habeas corpus.134 However, Justice 
Kennedy did not acknowledge that the lack of access to lawyers while 
the Abbasi plaintiffs were in high-security detention effectively pre-
cluded access to these remedies.135 Under the circumstances, a suit for 
damages was the only legal remedy available to deter future abuses or 
compensate those wronged. 
C. Misconstruing Congressional Silence 
The Abbasi Court’s upending of the traditional pro-remedy pre-
sumption is even more salient in its discussion of Congress’s post-9/11 
posture regarding remedies for official misconduct. Justice Kennedy as-
serted that Congress was aware of the risk of harsh detention conditions 
and chose to authorize only limited measures to address the problem, 
such as requiring reports by the Justice Department’s Office of the 
Inspector General (“OIG”).136 According to Justice Kennedy, Congress’s 
minimalist approach to remedies constituted evidence that legislators’ 
failure to expressly authorize suits for damages was more than a “mere 
oversight” or product of inadvertence.137 However, Justice Kennedy 
failed to acknowledge that the meaning of congressional silence is fre-
quently subject to multiple interpretations.138 
At least one plausible interpretation of legislative silence supports 
the availability of Bivens remedies. The litigation on the detainees’ be-
half was the subject of multiple decisions in district and appellate courts 
prior to the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision limiting remedies in Iqbal. 
At any time prior to the Court’s issuance of its decision in Abbasi, 
Congress could have acted to preclude Bivens remedies for detainees. 
Congress never did so. Congress’s inaction may, without more, consti-
tute slender evidence that legislators favored monetary relief for de-
tainees. Nevertheless, that inference is at least as plausible as Justice 
 
are “even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context 
of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive or 
other equitable relief . . . [t]he risk of personal damages liability is more likely 
to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions 
concerning national-security policy.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 
(2017) (emphasis added). 
134. Id. at 1862–63. 
135. See Corn et al., supra note 71, at 296. 
136. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862. 
137. Id. 
138. See Ethan J. Leib & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 Va. L. 
Rev. 1487, 1545 (2017). 
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Kennedy’s construction of silence as connoting legislative disfavor. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion failed to explain why his construction was 
superior. That omission is particularly glaring in light of the traditional 
pro-remedies presumption that dates back to Founding Era national 
security cases, such as Little v. Barreme and Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy. 
D. The Novelty Test and Moral Hazard Versus Sound Judgment on 
National Security Issues 
In addition, Justice Kennedy’s focus on novelty as the touchstone 
for denying access to Bivens increases moral hazard for officials. Moral 
hazard is a pervasive risk of insurance: individuals who know they will 
be shielded from the consequences of wrongdoing have an incentive to 
fall short of what law or practice requires.139 Insurance can take many 
forms. It can provide financial assistance, as in insurance policies or the 
public indemnification that protects most if not all federal officials from 
paying out of pocket for lawsuits against them.140 In addition, “insur-
ance”—defined broadly—can include legal doctrines that hinder 
litigation against officials in the first place. These doctrines include the 
limits on Bivens suits that the Court articulated in Abbasi. Indeed, the 
combination of Abbasi and indemnification doubles down on moral 
hazard. 
Moral hazard discourages officials from heeding the lessons of the 
past. Precedents like Abbasi signal to officials that a proactive approach 
to legal requirements is unnecessary, since only a limited range of con-
duct will trigger even the possibility of recovery by plaintiffs alleging 
official wrongs. That double dose of legal protection encourages the 
“spirit of injustice” that Hamilton cautioned against in Federalist No. 
78:141 a toxic elixir that victimized Japanese-Americans during World 
War II and the post-9/11 immigration detainees. 
 
139. Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow first explained the concept of moral 
hazard. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of 
Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941, 961 (1963) (explaining that in health 
care, the availability of reimbursement care diminishes a consumer’s 
incentive to seek the most cost-effective provider); Tom Baker, On the 
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 270 (1996) (noting that 
individuals with insurance will often take less care); Steven Shavell, On 
Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541, 541–42 (1979) (discussing 
moral hazard and insurance); cf. Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate 
Crime, Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 
7 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 55, 79–80 (2006) (discussing moral hazard in 
corporate compensation to managers on reimbursement of defense costs). 
140. See Cornelia L.T. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of 
Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 Geo. L.J. 65, 76–77 
(1999). 
141. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 12, at 470. 
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Abbasi and Iqbal portray the exercise of legal reasoning in national 
security law as an arena fraught with peril, instead of a venue for sound 
judgments that balance vigilance against threats and the maintenance 
of constitutional values. To illustrate how the Court’s view clashes with 
our best view of official decision-making, consider the example of a high-
ly fraught decision in the foreign policy realm: the U.S. approach to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.142  
Robert F. Kennedy, who served as the Attorney General and in 
that capacity was a principal advisor to his brother, President John F. 
Kennedy, was acutely conscious of the law. Robert Kennedy counseled 
against a military strike on Cuba in part because he rightly saw such 
action as a violation of international law limiting the use of force and 
as a discordant echo of the attack over twenty years earlier by Japan 
on American forces at Pearl Harbor.143 Citing that analogy as a caution-
ary tale, Kennedy and lawyers in the Administration recommended a 
targeted naval blockade against Soviet missile shipments to Cuba rath-
er than an all-out attack.144 
That approach diffused the crisis, although its international law 
bona fides were not entirely settled—then or now. Attorney General 
Kennedy’s appreciation of legal constraints did not have a chilling 
effect. Quite the opposite: it informed President Kennedy’s thinking,145 
generating an ingenious approach that resolved the situation. 
Law as analogy frequently plays this constructive role. That should 
not be surprising, since any system of law—especially a common law 
system—relies on courts and other players to decide what is reasonable 
in new situations. Looking to that system for guidance is a straight-
forward move that will typically refine official decisions, instead of sti-
fling decisions at their inception, as Justice Kennedy seemed to fear in 
Abbasi. 
The Framers understood this well. The Federalist Papers feature 
scores of analogies to history or past practice. These analogies were 
 
142. See Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 
53 Hous. L. Rev. 971, 985 (2016); Bob Bauer, The National Security 
Lawyer, in Crisis: When the “Best View” of the Law May Not Be the Best 
View 6–30, (NYU Pub. L. & Leg. Theory Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 17-08, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2931165 [https://perma.cc/5RZZ-5934]; Peter Margulies, When to Push 
the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National Security Strategy, 
30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 642,  669–72 (2007). 
143. Margulies, supra note 142, at 669–70. 
144. Id. at 670. 
145. Id. at 669; cf. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: 
International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 
1791, 1826–28, 1835 (2009) (discussing institutionalist vision of international 
and constitutional law as coordinated games). 
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considered prime sources of wisdom by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.146 
Often, those prescriptions may require tailoring to present conditions. 
However, that look to the past and the tailoring of past prescriptions 
to present uses is a crucial form of discipline. That discipline, in turn, 
ensures that, in Jay’s words, decisions will be “temperate and cool,” not 
precipitous.147 
Hamilton’s letters as Phocion critiquing the persecution of loyalists 
after the American Revolution148 provide a distinctive counterpoint to 
Justice Kennedy’s assertion that the perceived novelty of legal issues 
weakens the case for robust remedies against errant officials. Hamilton 
was admittedly often a champion of deference to the Executive on na-
tional security and foreign affairs.149 Nevertheless, Hamilton also wrote 
eloquently about the need to apply venerable principles to new chal-
lenges. In meeting these challenges, Hamilton extolled the avoidance of 
arbitrariness and “discrimination.”150 Hamilton counseled skepticism 
about claims that “revolution,” including implicitly the American Rev-
olution, had made those principles less useful.151 While the novelty of 
certain questions might require tweaking principles in some respects, 
that adaptive process made the search for useful analogies from the past 
even more urgent. 
A diligent search for analogies would surely have informed the de-
cisions of senior officials regarding the post-9/11 immigration deten-
tions, just as it would have informed deliberations about the Japanese-
American internment decades earlier. Consider the broad proposition 
that detention of an individual should require some individualized evi-
dence that the individual poses a threat. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
 
146. See generally McGowan, supra note 40 (discussing the method and 
perspective of The Federalist’s authors). 
147. See The Federalist No. 3, at 45 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
Ironically, in an earlier opinion, Justice Kennedy cited Jay’s concern that 
border states’ propensity for “sudden irritation” would skew U.S. foreign 
policy unless a strong federal authority tempered that tendency. See Arizona 
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing a later edition of The 
Federalist No. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)). 
148. See Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 288. 
149. Typifying this concern, in Federalist No. 23, Hamilton warned, “it is 
impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national 
exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may 
be necessary to satisfy them.” The Federalist No. 23, at 153 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in original). 
150. Second Letter from Phocion, supra note 119, at 321. 
151. Id. 
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Abbasi acknowledges this principle’s force.152 However, the Justice De-
partment OIG Report concluded that evidence played little or no role 
in decisions about post-9/11 detention—including the classification of 
detainees as part of the “INS List” that triggered harsh conditions and 
restrictions on contact with the outside world.153 There simply was no 
evidence of terrorist ties for the overwhelming majority of detainees.154 
It is reasonable to assume that senior officials either knew that, or could 
readily have inferred it, since they surely would have received such evi-
dence if it were available. 
Perhaps, as some evidence in the record reflects, senior officials 
believed that detaining individuals in maximum security settings would 
dial up the “pressure” on detainees and shake loose information that 
detainees had previously withheld. However, that strategy casts a 
different, less flattering light on Justice Kennedy’s assertion that lia-
bility for damages would exert a chilling effect on official decision mak-
ing. No U.S. official—senior, intermediate, or line-level—can order or 
knowingly enable physical brutality against those in custody.155 Curbing 
such conduct would not engender adverse consequences to national 
security. 
In sum, there was very little that was truly “new” about the legal 
questions surrounding the post-9/11 immigration detentions. Every 
plausible explanation for senior officials’ decisions regarding the post-
9/11 detainees described conduct that the law deters in other con-
texts.156 Deterring such wanton behavior would be a feature, not a 
“bug,” of suits for damages. 
 
152. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861–62 (noting the importance of courts 
“when individual liberties are at stake”) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 527, 532–37 (2004)). 
153. See September 11 Detainees, supra note 75, at 41–42. 
154. Id. 
155. Ordering or knowingly enabling such abuse would be well above the 
threshold for finding unconstitutional conduct. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 
1864–65 (citing principle of “deliberate indifference” of prisoners’ medical 
needs in course of justifying remand to the Second Circuit for review of a 
claim against a warden of a federal correctional facility where abuse of 
detainees occurred, while suggesting that the standard for adjudicating the 
claim that a warden “allowed guards to abuse pre-trial detainees” is “less 
clear” and reiterating that post-9/11 context was “new” and thus would have 
required at least a “modest extension” of precedent). 
156. At the conclusion of discovery or trial, the plaintiffs in Abbasi may not have 
been able to show that senior officials ordered or knowingly enabled abuse 
of detainees. However, the effect of the Court’s decision was to deny the 
plaintiffs the opportunity to try to make this showing regarding senior 
officials. 
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Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Abbasi cements a trend that had 
been evident for some time: the narrowing of Bivens. Justifying Abbasi’s 
definitive shift away from permitting suits for damages implied directly 
from the Constitution, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court cited 
two interrelated factors: 1) the risk of chilling official decisions on 
important national security cases, and 2) the need to permit Congress 
to balance that risk against the importance of compensating victims 
and deterring future official misconduct. Unfortunately, history and 
constitutional values provide little support for Abbasi’s outcome. 
Since the Articles of Confederation era, the American law of official 
liability rested on a pro-remedies presumption. Under this presumption, 
courts could assess blame, and an official could seek ex-post indem-
nification from Congress. On rare occasions, Congress would prospec-
tively grant immunity to certain kinds of officials. That said, having a 
remedy available entailing monetary relief was the default position 
adopted by courts, including prominent decisions such as Little v. 
Barreme and Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy. That 
accountability was viewed as central for the protection of rights in a 
constitutional republic. Moreover, the views of the Framers coalesced 
with this view. Hamilton, in particular, understood that judicial review 
was a vital safeguard. Like his colleagues in drafting and advocating for 
the Constitution, Hamilton also understood that the ability of foreign 
nationals to secure monetary remedies in U.S. courts was a crucial asset 
in the new republic’s quest for stability. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens built on this pro-remedy 
presumption. Both Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, and Justice 
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, stressed the presumption that Con-
gress had delegated equitable discretion to the courts to select among 
remedies and choose to make a damages remedy available when that 
was necessary to promote compliance with constitutional values. 
Upending this presumption, Abbasi fails to support the change it 
marked from history and the Framers’ understandings. Justice 
Kennedy’s concerns about chilling executive decisions and supplanting 
Congress’s role ring hollow in light of longtime practice with the 
availability of damages against errant government officials. In partic-
ular, Justice Kennedy’s assertion that damages could be more intrusive 
to officials than injunctive relief ran counter to over two centuries of 
doctrine and practice. The distinction that Justice Kennedy drew be-
tween “new” and traditional uses of Bivens allowed officials a con-
venient “out” from accountability. The Abbasi Court’s wariness about 
remedies gives officials no incentive to avoid future abuses that echo 
the post-9/11 immigration detentions. 
Perhaps a culture of fidelity to law will guard against future grim 
episodes like the Japanese-American internment. However, those who 
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wished that remedies would encourage learning Korematsu’s lessons can 
rightly fear that Abbasi will permit future officials to cut corners. 
Abbasi’s abridgment of remedies seems like a prescription for continued 
close encounters with official overreaching whenever the symptoms of 
crisis appear. 
